Over the past few years, there has been a marked increase in the volume of content on the topic of how to be a “true Kazakh woman.” Among the most notable examples of this are the emergence of uyatmen who police women’s behavior in public, the viral short film Zhezokshe about how young Kazakh women should dress modestly in order to avoid harassment and violence, a series of lectures on the moral education of young women, and the release of Qaraqat Abden’s book You Are a Kazakh Girl. Be Proud!

This trend piqued my curiosity back in 2019, prompting me to undertake an ethnographic study of gendered nationalism in Kazakhstan. As a Kazakh woman myself, I sought to observe the way in which societal expectations imposed on women and victim-blaming of female survivors of sexual violence are tied to Kazakh national identity, as well as explain why this is.

Author

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Aizada Arystanbek

Aizada Arystanbek is a Kazakhstani intersectional feminist, activist, and sociologist specializing in gender and culture, nationalism, and decoloniality. She received her Master of Arts degree in Gender Studies from Central European University and is currently pursuing her Ph.D. at the Department of Sociology at Rutgers University. Aizada sees her work as an intersection of research and activism and is dedicated to contributing to the non-violent production of knowledge on Central Asia.

Nationalism versus Traditionalism

Nationalism is often conceptualized as a phenomenon that has an equal effect on all members of a community. However, many feminist scholars have argued that nationalism is inherently gendered, putting a disproportionate burden of cultural representation and biological reproduction on women. By recognizing the importance of nationalism in a contemporary patriarchal culture, we add intricacy to the vague concept of traditionalism, which presupposes a rather linear idea of feminist liberation. According to the traditionalist narrative, the women’s rights movement has taken a linear trajectory, from a more conservative society to a more egalitarian and progressive one. Focus on traditionalism paints contemporary misogynistic practices as echoes of the past that seek to undermine women’s liberation today. Not only does this view negate positive aspects of many traditions that are pillars of our communities, but it also fails to explain why misogyny persists even in societies that have supposedly reached modernity and are governed democratically rather than traditionally. Moreover, if traditions themselves were so core to misogyny, then many men exhibiting misogynistic traits would arguably be more traditional in all their behaviors, not just when it comes to women. Yet looking at male perpetrators of gender-based violence, they do not necessarily look “traditionalist” or lead a traditionalist lifestyle.

Nationalism is what makes traditions matter. Nationalism helps us understand why particular traditions become so important to patriarchal societies and how they are enforced unequally onto male and female members of society. It illuminates why misogyny continues to exist even when misogynistic traditions appear to have been expelled from state policies. Our societies’ national identities are built around the idea of the “Other,” a multifaceted third party that is a covert or overt threat to the survival and thriving of a community. The fear of being undermined by the Other—be it immigrants from the “Third World,” war refugees, or local minorities—is what drives patriarchal societies to place a burden of biological reproduction and cultural transmission on women. Women’s bodies thus cease to belong to women themselves and become weaponized by their communities on the pretense of national survival and wellbeing.

One concept I found particularly useful is the idea of hegemonic femininity: a set of standards of behavior that is perceived as the ultimate expression of desirable femininity and against which the gender expression of all female members of a community is measured. Hegemonic femininity presupposes that womanhood is a homogeneous identity that is always positioned in a subservient position to masculinity and demands heteronormative behavior from women for the sake of a traditional, monogamous, heterosexual family. Hegemonic femininity is tied to nationalism, as it is seen as a tool for ensuring the survival of the nation and the preservation of its traditions and uniqueness. By being made into representatives of national culture, women are placed on a metaphorical pedestal from which they ultimately fall either by acting on their humanity or by becoming a subject of sexual violence and, subsequently, victim-blaming.

In my study, I used digital ethnography to trace how casual interactions in online settings—namely, comments on social media—perpetuate these standards of hegemonic femininity and normalize victim-blaming and the stigmatization of female survivors of sexual violence.

My main finding is that digital spaces of the Kazakhstani internet perpetuate real-life patriarchal dynamics. Kazakh women are forced to perform hegemonic femininity and represent the nation’s honor even when they fall victim to sexual violence at the hands of their countrymen. Traditions and cultural mores are continuously imposed on Kazakh women in different spaces and contexts, with violence increasingly normalized against those women who do not appear to abide by the standards of hegemonic femininity.

For Kazakhs, Who Is the Other?

Another indication that victim-blaming of female survivors of sexual violence is closely connected to nationalism and ideas of national honor is the constant blaming of the “Other” I observed in online comments discussing the root cause of violence against women. For instance, in 2019, NUR.kz published a short video reporting that cases of domestic abuse had increased by more than 100% in 2018 and that, according to UN Women, approximately 400 Kazakhstani women die from domestic abuse each year. The video, which had received 153,000 views and 397 comments on Instagram as of this writing, goes on to note that cultural and religious practices contribute to the perpetuation of violence. Observing that an international organization had provided the statistics, many users expressed doubts about the data’s authenticity and relevance to the Kazakhstani context. These comments juxtapose Kazakh culture against “Western” culture, as these users argue that the only way to tackle the issue of violence against women in the country is to preserve the uniqueness of Kazakh culture and its “morally right” behavior—such as heteronormative femininity. According to some commentators, the emancipation of women and the emasculation of men are also at the root of the problem of rampant sexual violence in the country. This narrative juxtaposes the feminist movement and the empowerment of women against the preservation of the institution of the family in the country. Violence against women is then set up as a natural consequence of Kazakh women’s breach of hegemonic femininity, which is seen as the only way to ensure the reproduction of the nation and the maintenance of its cultural borders.

Uncivilized Self

One of the more interesting trends I observed was internal divides within the Kazakh national identity. As in other societies, while traditionalists blame modernity, modernists blame tradition. The internal divide that juxtaposes traditionalism and modernity has been imported to all countries by the global imperial and capitalist system. Thus, within “Third World” communities, those who are less globalized and more closely tied to certain traditional—but not necessarily misogynistic—practices are perceived as “uncivilized.” The idea of uncivilized behavior is rooted in colonial ways of thinking. For example, in Kazakhstan, the idea of civilization is often tied to such colonial features as speaking Russian, going to a Russian-speaking school, and consuming non-Kazakh cultural content. While many social media users blamed the West for its corruption of society, some also blamed certain regions of Kazakhstan and the “savage” local culture for perpetuating misogynistic behavior. For example, a few commentators employed the words mambet and mambetism when pointing fingers at various regions (particularly the South and the West of the country) and discussing their role in normalizing violence against women.

Thus, the idea of the Other that helps fuel misogynistic nationalist behaviors does not always come from external sources. Internal divisions along the linear view of modernity also create an internal Other: uncivilized practices rooted in many contexts, from postcolonialism to religiosity.

My study helped me to delve into the nature of Kazakh nationalism and its connection to the normalization of violence against women. National culture places Kazakh women in a precarious position where they are expected to adhere to Kazakh standards of hegemonic femininity even as victims of gender-based violence. Looking at online comments by various users across multiple platforms provides evidence that Kazakh women’s bodies and behavior are subjected to constant policing by others, as they are expected to act according to the standards of hegemonic femininity to preserve their respectability and right to protection. These standards of hegemonic femininity are attached to women even when they suffer from sexual violence like rape and domestic abuse, as evidenced by the way online users fuse common rape myths and sexist stereotypes about victims of domestic violence with the national culture and ideas of “Kazakhness.” Thinking about nationalism critically and understanding its gendered norms shines a light on victim-blaming as a social phenomenon and helps us to understand that it does not occur randomly, but is rather closely intertwined with local understandings of femininity and respectability.

It is important to note now, especially as Kazakhstan is experiencing a resurgence of a grassroots decolonial movement and Russia, its biggest neighbor, is waging war against Ukraine, another former Soviet state, that traditions and community organizing do not have to carry the misogynistic aspects often assigned to them. Resistance to the imperial way of thinking and to internalized ideas of civilization and modernity, as well as a new appreciation for indigenous practices and customs, are important parts of decolonization. However, as my study points out, it is vital to remain vigilant as to which power groups are popularizing which traditions and views and how these limit or threaten the safety of community members.

All illustrations by
Dinara Satbayeva

In Islamic states or in countries with predominantly Muslim populations, mosques are one of the forms of nation-building. They serve as a means to visually demonstrate the attitude of the nation towards Islam. These majestic buildings are located in the capitals of the Islamic world and compete with one another in beauty and size. Throughout history, mosques were not only places of worship, but they also served the purpose of promoting political doctrines and the political will of leading elites.

In the modern world, mosques are used to promote the geopolitical interests of leading Muslim countries, or in other words, they become an effective means of “soft power” policy. In recent years, countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar have sponsored around the world the construction of thousands of mosques, as well as religious schools and centers through various charitable foundations. This charitable activity not only aims to create a space for Muslims to pray but also often challenges the basic tenets and principles of the local Islamic thought that has developed in a particular country. Experts have a name for this mosque-related policy – “The Mosque Diplomacy”. 

How is “mosque diplomacy” used in Central Asia? What are the goals of the countries that use this diplomacy and what is its geopolitical impact?

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was discovered that there was a serious shortage of mosques in Central Asia. Economically weak and young republics did not have the capacity to construct mosques meeting population demands and relied on help from leading Muslim countries to solve the problem. Saudi Arabia and Turkey provided direct assistance in this regard. According to data from 1989, 300 mosques operated throughout the Soviet Union; by 1993, with the help of sponsors, the number of mosques in only Uzbekistan increased to over 6,000.

Despite the fact that since the 2000s the construction of foreign-sponsored mosques was tightly regulated by the state, now the regulation of most of the central mosques in the region has been liberalized to allow the construction with foreign involvement. For countries competing with each other in expanding their spheres of influence in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, “mosque diplomacy” is viewed as an additional foreign policy tool.

Saudi Arabia

According to Foreign Policy, the Saudis have spent about $100 billion on Wahhabist propaganda over the past decades. Saudi Arabia wants to remain a patron of global Islam. At the same time, their methods of propaganda and influence are diverse, from the construction of mosques and schools, creation and distribution of textbooks, and training of imams to financing educational centers and cultural institutions. The Saudi charitable foundations have been active in Central Asia since the 90s allocating funds for the construction and repair of hundreds of mosques.

Reports from the Saudi Arabia World Committee for Islamic Salvation reflect the implementation of these active charitable activities in Central Asia and Azerbaijan between the years of 1993 to 1997. During the four years analyzed in the report, the Committee assisted in the construction and restoration of more than 110 mosques in the Central Asian republics. In the long term, the goal is to restore 26 thousand mosques, “closed by red communism and turned into warehouses and museums.”

Saudi Arabia participates in the construction of mosques in Central Asia not directly, but through financial support to various organizations. 

First, Saudi Arabia finances various non-government charitable foundations. For example, Saudi Arabia funded the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), which as of 2017, built 200 mosques in Kyrgyzstan. The organization, registered in Kyrgyzstan, reportedly financed the construction of about 70 percent of the mosques in the country. In 2012, the Suleiman Too Mosque, recognized at the time as the largest mosque in the country, was built in Osh with financial assistance from WAMY and the United Arab Emirates.

Second, in the 90s, representatives of the Central Asian diaspora living in Saudi Arabia and known there as Bukharians were involved in sponsoring activities. The construction of religious institutions in the region was stimulated with the help of the waqf funds they owned. One of them is the Sheikh Zainuddin Cathedral Mosque in Tashkent, designed for 6,000 worshipers, which was constructed at the expense of charitable funds of Uzbek compatriots from Mecca.

Another area they use is to support local entrepreneurs, establish close ties with them, and then encourage them to organize religious institutions, which usually promote Salafism and Wahhabism. Aurelie Biard explored this in Kazakhstan. According to her, the movements of transnational Salafism collaborate with Kazakh entrepreneurs. Although Kazakhstan maintains various ties with Saudi Arabia, mainly through entrepreneurial channels, the Kazakh offshoots of Salafis rarely receive direct financial assistance from Saudi Arabia. Through Salafism and its sponsorship, the construction of mosques, and the work with entrepreneurs Saudi Arabia (as well as other Arab Gulf states) contributes to the spread of the ideas that are not generally accepted in the country. According to unofficial data, there are about 19,000 Salafis in Kazakhstan.

According to international observers, achieving the desired results in Central Asia by Saudi Arabia’s “mosque diplomacy” is difficult. The governments of Central Asia are secular. According to O. Roy’s interpretation, Islam forms the society in the region, but does not influence politics. Governments in the region are seeking to control the official clergy and their authority in large mosques. The elite is opposed to the spread of various religious views propagated from abroad, in particular, Salafism and Wahhabism by Saudi Arabia. They also are wary of the active participation of religion in political processes. “Mosque diplomacy ” conducted by Saudi Arabia in Central Asia does not have as many opportunities as it would assume, and while it would seem that its rival, Turkey, prevails here, it too faces some obstacles.

Turkey

As one of the regional leaders, Turkey is building a large number of mosques around the world, including dozens of mosques in Africa, Europe, and America. In particular, a mosque built with the help of Turkey in the United States in 2016 is recognized as the largest Islamic center in the Northern Hemisphere.

Hundreds of charitable foundations in Turkey sponsor the construction of mosques in Europe and Africa, as well as in Central Asia. Turkey’s charitable activities related to the construction of mosques are more often observed in Kyrgyzstan than elsewhere in Central Asia. Turkey, through its powerful Directorate for Religious Affairs, Diyanet, is actively involved in the funding of organizations focusing on religious education and the construction of schools, mosques, and madrassas throughout Kyrgyzstan. One of the largest mosques in Central Asia was opened in Bishkek on September 2, 2018, by the former Kyrgyz President Sooronbai Jeenbekov and the President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The mosque, designed in the tradition of Ottoman architecture, was built with the help of Turkey.

According to the experts of the Al-Jazeera Research Center, if we consider that there is a competition in the Central Asian region for the implementation of ” mosque diplomacy”, then Turkey’s opportunities are wider here. This is because the option proposed by Turkey for the mosques and religious institutions is preferable in comparison to the Wahhabi teachings of Saudi Arabia, and it is more historically closer with the leadership of the region. In contrast to the conservative Hanbali madhhab school, which forms the basis of Wahhabism, the Hanafi madhhab school widespread in Central Asia and Turkey is relatively liberal and gives greater freedom in the interpretation of religious laws.

However, one should not forget another factor hindering Turkey’s “mosque diplomacy” and its policies. In recent years, nationalism has been rising in Turkey. The country sometimes advances the vision to unite all the Turkic peoples of the world but this policy does not suit the Central Asian states, which historically had perceived Pan-turkism as dangerous and threatening its stability and relations with Russia. 

Qatar

Established in 1992, the Qatar Charity reports the construction of 7,896 mosques worldwide to date. More than a hundred charitable organizations in the State of Qatar have funded the construction of mosques and madrassas, support for religious education, and support for various religious organizations around the world in recent years, despite the fact that the organizations they fund sometimes represent radical Islamic groups. Qatar, in its foreign policy, pays attention to the propaganda of political Islam and the competition with its regional rivals for influence. Therefore, this country is considered an active participant in ” mosque diplomacy.”

Despite the fact that Qatar is not active in the implementation of foreign policy in Central Asia, its “mosque diplomacy” in the region has led to tangible results. The State of Qatar has sponsored the construction of several large mosques in the region. In particular, they allocated 70 million US dollars for the construction of the Dushanbe Central Mosque in Tajikistan, which is said to be the largest mosque in the CIS. This mosque, the total cost of which is $100 million, can simultaneously serve 115 thousand prayers.

The government of Qatar also funded the construction of The Nur Astana Islamic Cultural Center. The center consists of The Nur Astana Mosque, designed for five thousand believers, the Islamic Research Center, and a religious educational institution. In recent years, the Qatari government has sponsored the construction of more than 30 mosques and religious educational institutions in Kyrgyzstan.

Qatar’s sponsorship of mosques and other religious institutions differs from the policies of Turkey and Saudi Arabia. As mentioned above, Qatar is not an active participant in the geopolitical processes in the region; it does not have large capital invested in regional markets. For example, it allocated 70 million US dollars for the construction of a mosque in Dushanbe in 2009, although, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan, in 2014 the mutual trade turnover between the two did not even reach 60 thousand US dollars. Qatar is not the main trade partner for Tajikistan; at the same time, Tajikistan does not represent important strategic importance for Qatar.

With Kazakhstan, the circumstances are different; businessmen in Qatar are interested in participating in energy and other economic projects in Kazakhstan, so they take part in various charitable events and financing projects.

With Kyrgyzstan, the situation is even more serious. Today the government of the republic is establishing close ties and relations with all Arab states of the Persian Gulf, including Qatar. According to an analyst from Kyrgyzstan E.G. Garbuzarova, “the generous funds that Qatar and Saudi Arabia are investing in Kyrgyzstan are worrying. Since it is well known that in recent years both states have supported radical Islamist groups to achieve their geopolitical goals. These countries are funding the construction of mosques in southern Kyrgyzstan”.

The concern is the fact that the State of Qatar, after the events of the “Arab Spring” in the Middle East, was accused of cooperation with radical Islamist groups. Particularly, there are talks about its links with international terrorist organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State.

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates tops the list of the Muslim states that invest in the economy of the region, but they do not take an active part in the construction of mosques and other religious institutions. At the same time, UAE does participate in ” mosque diplomacy” in Central Asia. For example, the Emirati Fund Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan allocated funds for the construction of the Shymkent Cathedral Mosque, which is considered the largest in the territory of South Kazakhstan. Along with this, this fund has established active cooperation with the Waqf Foundation in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan planned to implement promising projects in various directions with the participation of this leading charitable organization from the UAE.

The UAE wants to have a greater influence on the markets of the region through the implementation of various charity events, as well as allocating funds for the development of science, education, and technology. But they refrain from using funds that may have an impact on the religious situation in Central Asia.

In conclusion, it should be said that “mosque diplomacy” carried out in Central Asia by the leading Muslim states carries both risks and benefits – it is capable of influencing the religious situation in the region but it also creates a new architectural look for the Central Asian capitals, decidedly Muslim.

Feminism is not adequately perceived in Central Asian societies. Some consider it as a threat to the existing traditions of the patriarchal foundation, when a woman (responsible for too many things in the family) can get out of control, damaging the nation in its demographic development. Some believe that women have been already quite liberated in Central Asia, and therefore their excessive demands for freedom contribute to the destabilization of the region.

To better understand this, I met with two feminist activists and proponents of gender equality and social justice from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Zulaykho Usmanova, a researcher from Tajikistan, and Altyn Kapalova, art activist from Kyrgyzstan.

I talked with each of these leading figures in Central Asia about the uprise of feminist movements in Central Asia and the role of arts in reflecting the global issue on gender equality.

Author

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Lolisanam Ulugova

Lolisanam has been an art manager in Tajikistan since 2000. She has contributed to writing and producing the nation’s first 3-D animation film, a short designed to promote awareness of environmental issues among children. She holds a Master’s degree from the University of Turin, Italy and an undergraduate degree in Russian Language and Literature. She was a Global Cultural Fellow at the Institute for International Cultural Relations at the University of Edinburgh and participated in the Central Asian-Azerbaijan (CAAFP) fellowship program at the George Washington University at Elliott School of International Affairs for Fall 2019.

Zulaykho Usmanova

What does Tajik art mean in gender terms? What is it like? Is there a big difference in the images/representations of the social roles between the Soviet period and modern Tajikistan?

In the Soviet period, women were considered as an oppressed class, and the main goal of the state was to liberate women and achieve their equality with men in all social spheres: legal, economic, social, and political. The political and civil equality of women and men was enshrined in the first Soviet Constitution of 1918; the first decrees provided women with the fullness of civil rights and freedoms and equalized them with men in the face of the law, and the decrees of TurkTSIK (the Turkistan implementing body) in 1924 set legal responsibility for polygamy and forced marriage against the will of the woman. In order to achieve the time period’s goals around women’s liberation, it fought traditional and religious vestiges related to the status of a woman: retreat of a woman, early marriage, polygamy, kalym (ransom), etc.

As for arts in the Soviet period, theaters and cinematographers often raised the subject of women’s emancipation and criticized traditional stereotypes and prejudices about the place and role of women.

I would especially like to note the film Zumrad, 1961 (dir. Alexander Davidson and Abdusalom Rakhimov, Tajikfilm) which conveyed a rather progressive message about a young woman who managed to get away from her violent husband, resist stereotypes and stigma, and ultimately make a professional career.

Regarding the arts of independent Tajikistan, the arts have the same agenda of reflecting a condition of building an independent national state. The president, Emomali Rahmon, pays attention to the issue of educating girls and women, expanding their rights and opportunities. However, the country’s art institutions remain quite traditional and do not demonstrate topics in this regard. Perhaps I am not very aware of the new theatrical productions and films, but I do not recall seeing those that would reflect images of strong, independent, modern women.

Modern Tajik culture inherently contains the idea of ​​respecting a woman, especially a woman-mother, observing cultural norms that limit aggressive attitudes towards a woman, as well as a public demonstration of feelings. These standards require compliance with tactfulness in the sphere of marital relations. Nonetheless, the attitude towards women in society has been a rather controversial issue. This attitude strongly depends on the type of locality (rural or urban), the level of education of the individual, his/her level of engagement with the ideas of the patriarchy, and, ultimately, the level of internal freedom of the individual. To be honest, I have little hope that the adult generation (at age of 40-45 years and older) can change old stereotypes.

As for the Tajik society’s attitude toward single women, I state with bitterness that we are still far from having an equal and fair attitude towards them, regardless of their age and social status. The mandatory presence of a man (father, brother, husband, son) to be next to their women (with the purpose of controlling or monitoring) has been considered to be the norm in Tajik society and has put independent women into a lower social position. There is hope for the younger generation, which is more open to new ideas. They might create a Tajik society of the future, where women will be equal to men.

You are part of a project created by Alla Rumyantseva, a curator from Tajikistan who has built a group of young artists and teaches them how to reflect on gender issues through contemporary art. What is important about this project, and what problems/risks exist to reflect gender issues?

I participated in Alla Rumyantseva’s project as a speaker. I had a presentation devoted to gender stereotypes and their “vitality” in the public mind. The presentation was well received by the audience and caused a lengthy discussion. I consider the project important, because during the project, important issues and problems of Tajik society are addressed. But I also think such projects should run on an ongoing basis, and not tied to the temporary grants. Among the risks of the discourse that Alla Rumyantseva raises, I consider the main risk to be a hail of criticism and rejection of feminist ideas in response to the project.

Alla Rumyanseva’s gender project, 2018-2020

“The tragic fate of a woman is a theme that has always been in the works of artists of all times and all nations. The tragedy would often be the effect of a woman’s lack of rights and freedoms, for the society has always perceived her first as the property of the parents, then of the husband. The situation of a woman in Tajik society now is largely the same as it has been since times immemorial. Like in the past, in the modern world, the Tajik woman has limited access to education, is subjected to violence both physical and psychological, and has to live in the conditions of an increasingly radicalized society, under stereotypes and high demands from society. These are all modern realities of Tajik women.”

(an excerpt from a booklet of the Alla Rumyanseva’s gender project, 2018-2020)

Feminism in Central Asia. What are the main causes of resistance to this movement in the region? Can you comment on the latest events related to the march in Bishkek on International Women’s Day and a public gathering of a group of Tajik feminists in Dushanbe? Do you see leverage on patriarchal forces in the region?

Feminism in Central Asia is just beginning to gain momentum. Unfortunately, understanding of feminism—awareness of its essence and goals—is rather weak throughout the region. The events of March 8 in Bishkek have shown this. These events also demonstrated the Russian media’s high level of influence on the consciousness of Central Asian residents. Most Russian TV channels tirelessly talk about feminism in a negative way, about its “bad” effect on Russian women. This is somewhat strange, bearing in mind the 25-year-old tradition of gender studies and the women’s movement in Russia. Nevertheless, a negative attitude towards feminism in one way or another affects the responsiveness of citizens of all countries in the region, makes them consider feminism an alien and harmful phenomenon, and causes them to oppose the actions of feminists.

Solving this issue requires long and painstaking work at the highest level as outreach and educational work with local communities—whose members must understand that gender equality is beneficial for the community, for families, and for the country as a whole. Such work should be carried out not only by holding large, beautiful, feminine events. It is necessary to carry out active activities to educate and raise the level of gender literacy of communities. To do this, we first need to train civil society organizations and governmental bodies on how to do this, and then financially support them—but namely through the activity aspect, not events.

In this era of rapid exchange of information and the development of AI (artificial intelligence), do you think that the increased information will ultimately reduce the pressure and dominance of the patriarchy?

I think that in the distant future, our descendants will be surprised to read and learn about patriarchy. Already now you can observe a small (so far) layer of young men and women who seem to be freer from patriarchal ideas, try to resist stereotypes, indicate gender awareness, and are quite loyal to feminism. It pleases and inspires hope. I believe that the ranks of these people will increase, and society will become more democratic and friendly to women. Today’s dominance of the patriarchy can be reduced by the active citizenship and solidarity of all progressive forces in society in steadily empowering women and girls and breaking stereotypes and stigma against women.

Altyn Kapalova

Please tell us about yourself as a curator and an art experimenter, what does contemporary art mean to you and your most significant projects in contemporary art?

For me, contemporary art is a tool for social changes. In my curatorial projects, I do not reflect the futility of being, poetic pathos, or the past and future. In all my curatorial projects I say, “guys, we have a social problem, here it is, we need to solve it.” The feminist agenda is the most important to me. I experiment a lot, trying through art to show the problems of women.

For example, I had a project when I traveled to villages and talked to rural women about contemporary art and invited them to talk about their problems and use contemporary art to help tell the story. In fact, they spoke a language that they did not know much—the language of art—but they spoke very loudly and vividly.

The project was called “A4. Village, Women, Art and Activism.” These four words in Kyrgyz begin with the letter “a.” Four capacious words that reveal the essence of this project: women from rural communities who express important social issues through artistic language. The local activists tried to speak the language of contemporary art, which is little known to them as I said. They touch on social issues that affect the life of their entire community. Among such problems are the informal institute of midwives, access to drinking water, and the subjects of family violence, women’s leisure, and women’s participation in political life. Aside from this project, I had curatorial projects in the fields of ecology, regional division, etc.

Up to now, my most significant project is the Feminnale. It is not because of the big scandal around the Feminnale—which made us famous enough, though I paid huge cost for it by baiting the traditionalists, etc. It is the most significant to me because of its content. This is the coolest concept of an exhibition that I have ever come up with: both the format of the exhibition and its theme. The format of the Feminism Biennale (Feminnale) is not tied to a place, it can take place in any country, in any city, and it can do so without political boundaries, without age restrictions, without discrimination on gender, sexual orientation, etc. The theme of the first Feminnale was devoted to women’s economic freedom. The co-curator Zhanna Araeva suggested the word “Kormilitsa” (nurse) to name the subject of the Feminnale. We conceptualized it by trying to think about who the nurse is, the one who is breastfeeding, who has to cook for the whole family, the one who is forced to be in labor migration and to be the earner. This topic covered a wide range of subjects from the stigma of women breastfeeding to economic violence against women, which is often associated with physical violence.

“The word Kormilitsa means both a female breadwinner and a provider in Russian. Thus, who is really that kormilitsa? A woman with milk in the ducts of her breasts? A woman who is responsible for cooking for family members (according to the assumptions of the patriarchal society)? A woman who leaves for labor migration to provide financially for a family? How much economic freedom does this woman have?”

(an excerpt from a call on the 1^st Feminnale of Contemporary Art, “Kormilitsa. Economic freedom. Woman”)

Feminism and Central Asia – what went wrong? It seems that the liberation of women in Central Asia took place at the dawn of the birth of Soviet power, and what has changed since the independence of the Central Asian republics?

It seems to me that “the liberation of the Central Asian women under the Soviet regime” is a big myth. This was the part of the Feminnale. I think it was a deal with the patriarchy. I can consider this just based on some available information on the dawn of the emergence of Soviet power. However, I know for sure about the late Soviet period. Because I lived in it, and there was no feminism at all. All my aunts plowed in the fields, worked in offices, and in factories; and in the evenings, they served all their relatives from father-in-law to the children of relatives—plus livestock, plus children, plus giving births endlessly, plus the husband, plus all the social networking of a big family and its toll on women. The time of independence has continued the exploitation of women. There is little that has changed. I am very far from romanticizing the pre-Soviet period. Yes, sometimes there were women rulers in our history stories. Rarely, but there were. But they were not because people created the conditions for an equal existence and equal opportunities.

I would rather say, “these women were not because of, but in spite of.” Contrary to the foundations, contrary to the system, contrary to prohibitions.

Back to the Feminnale, how you could assess its outcomes? How did the idea of the Feminnale first come to you? Its authenticity is undoubtful.

n 2019, I was in Almaty at “Femagora” and met female artists from Bishkek with a very clear feminist agenda. Honestly, I did not know about their existence. I realized that they are in the shadow of “male art.” I decided I needed to connect them with my counterparts on feminism in Bishkek, Kina Yusupova, Aida Musulmankulova, Zhanna Araeva, Gulyayim Aiylchy, Aigul Karabalina. They supported my idea to help them to be more visible to a wider audience. And in fact, with this small team we have provided an exhibition in which more than 20 countries and more than 50 artists took part.

It is important to emphasize that it was a grassroots initiative. We don’t have a donor or someone who has seriously supported and incurred expenses. We were supported by Kyrgyz businesses. The only organization that has signed up to this “dangerous” project was the Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan.

We were supported by Kyrgyz women throughout the country who had transferred amount as small as two dollars to our wall, which I admit with some trepidation. There were amounts of $100, too. The largest amount was $300. When a nurse from a hospitals transfers $2 to the Feminnale’s account, that nurse essentially sacrifices two of her dinners to you. Then you understand how important this exhibition was for women. I consider it as the main achievement of the Feminnale. That is the Feminnale in reality, and not the museum space where few people visit.

The Feminnale was one big challenge. From the moment of preparation to the present and afterwards. As for my works as a curator, it was very difficult initially, because of a lack of funds. I felt as though we went to unknown space where money was not enough, new rules of the game were imposed, and we were outside of market relations. I predicted that I would have to start investing my own money. Installation of the exhibition was around-the-clock because the museum gave little time for installation. The museum’s activities are not designed for exhibitions of contemporary art. And plus, since we could not use the services of express mails, we mainly used the services of state postal services for low cost, which normally took a long time. We were aware that that some works would arrive late, but we had tried. But the real hell happened after the opening of the exhibition. The director of the museum resigned. She and I were subjected to terrible harassment, both on social networks and on TV.

The mistreatment against me still continues, especially after my participation on the “March on 8^th March” events. (Kyrgyzstan police held about 70 activists for hours on March 8, 2020 without telling us the grounds for our detention or providing access to lawyers). We came under attack at the peaceful International Women’s Day march in Bishkek. A mob of men, many wearing medical masks or other face coverings, attacked us as we were beginning the march to call attention to the serious problem of violence against women in Kyrgyzstan. The masked men threw eggs at the marchers, dragged us to the ground, and destroyed our banners. When police arrived, the mob dispersed, but rather than seeking out the attackers, police forced us, the activists and march participants, to board the buses and took us to the police station. As a result of this gross detention with the use of physical strength, I had sprains on my arm and bruises on both my chest and arms.

What are your prospects for the development of the feminist movement in Central Asia? What steps need to be taken to achieve equality in the distribution of social and economic benefits in Central Asia?

These are very difficult questions. I have no answer to them. Until recently, I talked about what we need to start with in school textbooks. I was saying that while we are trying to work with an adult audience, these terrible textbooks and horrible school education assist in preparing a new army of rapists and their victims. However, after the Feminnale and the “March on 8th March,” I do not believe that anything can be changed in our countries.

Main photo: President Shavkat Mirziyoev with bloggers, August 2019

Media in Uzbekistan  represents an interesting object of study.

After President Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power, the media, which under the previous regime was laid up in official narratives and strict censorship, is now given the opportunity to provide more critical coverage and to develop in a freer and more pluralistic environment.

Nikita Makarenko, a blogger and a journalist based in Tashkent, talks about some of the implications of this “opening” almost four years ago.

How would you describe the current media market in Uzbekistan? What are the major media outlets? What does the main audience read: state-funded media, private outlets or bloggers?

The present media market in Uzbekistan reminds me of a very active “bazaar” with traders, customers and growing advertising budgets. Under former president Karimov, Uzbek media was an empty space, almost sterile. Anyone who took a risk to say something different was prosecuted. The profession of journalist was not considered prestigious, and it was not highly paid. In the past three years, the situation has slowly, but surely, turned 180 degrees. The old media has revived and became more active. Businessmen see the market’s potential and set up new TV channels along with online media. The media market begins to get more money. Now it is an overcrowded, noisy and scandalous small bazaar.

Interview with

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Nikita Makarenko

Nikita Makarenko is a journalist from Tashkent, Uzbekistan. He is a graduate of the faculty of journalism at the National University of Uzbekistan. He was a columnist and a special reporter for online media «Gazeta.uz». In 2020 he joined «Uzreport TV» to produce his own investigative TV show. In 2017 Nikita has received a prestigious CEC Artlsink fellowship and spend 6 weeks as a scholar resident at the Oberlin College (Ohio, USA) and in spring 2019, taught his own class on propaganda at the Oberlin College (Ohio, USA) as a visiting lecturer. From 2012 to 2015 Nikita led Central Asian arts’n’culture citizen-journalism project NewEurasia.net as the Managing Editor. In 2016, Nikita started his career as a playwright with his play «Airport» staged in the Ilkhom Theater. His new play «Tomorrow» was premiered in Tashkent in February 2020.

 Telegram channel: makarenko_channel, Twitter: nikmccaren

The present media market in Uzbekistan reminds me of a very active “bazaar” with traders, customers and growing advertising budgets. Under former president Karimov, Uzbek media was an empty space, almost sterile. Anyone who took a risk to say something different was prosecuted. The profession of journalist was not considered prestigious, and it was not highly paid. In the past three years, the situation has slowly, but surely, turned 180 degrees. The old media has revived and became more active. Businessmen see the market’s potential and set up new TV channels along with online media. The media market begins to get more money. Now it is an overcrowded, noisy and scandalous small bazaar.

Finding professional journalists remains a problem. In the previous years there was no substantial training for journalists. There was no place to gain experience; there was no one to lead by example; and the most promising journalists left the country. The lack of creative and professional journalists greatly delays further improvement of the market. True, in the 2020 academic year, several universities announced the opening of new departments of journalism – which may help to fill the gap. I personally would be happy to teach, but none of the local universities have invited me to join the department of journalism thus far.

As far as I remember, no solid studies of the media audience in Uzbekistan have been conducted. But recently, Internews published the results of an interesting survey. It reveals that in Uzbekistan, the vast majority of respondents of all ages prefer television. The Internet still trails behind. Only 57.7% of respondents use the Internet at all. But the most positive developments that happened with the media under Mirziyoyev took place only online. The first critical publications and investigations that came along with the “wind of freedom” were all published in the online media. It is there that we have heated and boiling discussions. Television remains a fairly empty resource subject to both state censorship and self-censorship. To some extent, only one or two private TV channels venture to raise some sensitive issues which have already been discussed among the Internet-readers.

A study by the “Public opinion” Institute, commissioned by Internews (2019) states that TV (in purple) is the main source of information in Uzbekistan across all age groups, from 14-18 to 60-65. Internet is marked blue, relatives and friends – yellow and social networks – light blue. The infographic also includes data for Tajikistan and Kazakhstan

Bloggers and the rise of their popularity are also a characteristic feature of modern Uzbekistan. They have a high credibility among readers, as they are often the first ones to raise sensitive issues, like corruption, crime, and abuse of power. Often, they report news earlier than online media resources. After all, even online media outlets have to “synchronize watches” against their own self-censorship. Some hot issues are never published in the media, but only by bloggers. However, bloggers manipulate their readers too by tending to give out unverified and contradictory information or by publishing paid materials without indicating that they are paid, and by engaging in political attacks.

President Mirziyoyev has urged the media to be more critical. In what kind of criticism are the media engaged in, who do they criticize and what are the main topics?

Online media is critical on a very wide range of topics; but this cannot be said about their colleagues in TV, radio, and print media. Criticism of public officials with ministerial rank and below, heads of regions and cities, deputies and senators is quite routine and painless for the authors. Criticism of the higher echelon of power is less common. This level still involves a certain level of self-censorship. Otherwise, there are no special obstacles. To the best of their abilities and courage, Uzbek media scrutinizes businessmen, state corporations, as well as domestic and foreign policy. The heads of regions and cities (khokims) are targeted more than others. The issues of illegal demolitions and real estate, poor infrastructure, freedom of speech and expression, the registration system, law enforcement agencies, and others have been fairly often reported in critical publications before the pandemic.

A study by the “Public opinion” Institute, commissioned by Internews (2019) asked their respondents if they think the media provides false information. A majority of respondents (purple) thinks this is extremely rare. About 11,3% (yellow and light blue) thinks that media provides false information often. The second graph shows what people do to fact-check the information. Most respondents would do nothing (blue), or search for fact in Internet (yellow) and ask friends (light blue).

As you mentioned already, Telegram and individual bloggers are very popular in Uzbekistan. Could you describe them briefly?

Uzbek Telegram is probably one of the most developed communities in this app messenger. It is unique, and this community presents an ideal research subject. According to App Annie, Uzbekistan is ranked second by the number of users on Telegram globally. We have a unique environment here: provocative bloggers, troll factories funded by state structures, nationalists, extremists, law enforcement agencies, and drug dealers get along on one messaging app. Telegram reminds me of a wild saloon where everyone can find fun to their liking. People post about everything on there. One can watch funny, locally shot videos or follow a smart channel about urban architecture. Fact checking is not an established law here; as a rule, Telegram is known for a huge number of fake accounts and is filled with rumors. The genre of fake documents or fake screenshots is very popular there. Many of these are created purposefully, with very specific goals. I cannot say that the audience is really prepared to check information on its own. This is why fake campaigns often succeed.

What can you tell about the Uzbek language media? How do they differ from the Russian language media in terms of the issues raised and the target audience?

The Uzbek language media is absolutely much more popular, and they probably have a hundred times larger audience than the Russian language media. However, these two types of media do not duplicate each other and exist in a strange symbiosis. Both are in demand by the audience and advertisers. One cannot say that the Russian language media earn significantly less because of their smaller audience. Russian and Uzbek language audiences are equally valuable despite the difference in numbers. Russian is most widely spoken in Tashkent, the most economically active region of Uzbekistan. This is the reason why advertisers are interested in the Russian-speaking audience.

The Uzbek language media tend to publish more translations from the international news agencies and foreign media materials. This segment takes up the biggest part of the agenda and leaves smaller space for local news. There is almost no international news in the Russian language media of Uzbekistan. Local news is dominant here by a ratio of about 90% to 10%. A reason for this that the Russian-speaking readers have no shortage of sources for international news.

There is a slight difference in the topics raised in local media, however. The Russian language media is not keeping up with regional coverage (life in the remote regions) due to the lack of their audience and journalists there. Mainly, they focus on the news from Tashkent. I think that critical issues regarding the protection of the environment, freedom of expression, rights of women and the disabled, and a general human rights agenda are more often raised in the Russian language media. The Uzbek language media writes about religion, national identity, language and history. Such stories are extremely rare in the Russian language media.

Is there any growth in business or economic journalism? How dependent are they on advertisers or other sources of funding?

Over the past three years, I witnessed a rapid growth in the development of online media. However, the media is not clearly segmented in Uzbekistan. In fact, all online media write about everything. There are several interesting projects in business media, but they are still far from being truly popular. The launching of Forbes Uzbekistan magazine has not become an attention-grabbing event yet. Kommersant.uz, the oldest business publication, was closed during the pandemic.

Private media outlets are very dependent on advertisers; 100% of private online media with employees which regularly publish from 5 to 10 materials a day are dependent on advertisers. They do not have any other sources of funding (except for the media, which are part of holdings or companies and which have general income). State funding is thin and the government is still suspicious towards foreign grants which support local media. Therefore, today advertising is the only chance for survival in Uzbekistan.

What do you think the Uzbek media lack (if not to speak about TV, but print and online media)? How much does the audience in Uzbekistan continue to rely on external (foreign) publications in mass media?

I believe that the Uzbek media is still confined within the chains of self-censorship. I understand that breaking these chains is not easy. It’s probably dangerous. But the barriers are still there, and not all issues can be covered. For example, I quit the job in the media outlet where I had worked for three years when my material was not published. I had to publish it in another media outlet. And there are not enough good journalists. This is the reason why media outlets are not able to develop. I think that the audience in Uzbekistan fully relies on local publications to get local information. The Russian-speaking audience continues to consume international information provided by foreign media publications. There is no competition here.

Is there a market for new independent media?

New media outlets with various levels of independence are being set up quite regularly. There are no barriers to register a media platform – this process takes place in a matter of days. Registration of an OOO [LLC] (limited liability company) can be done within 15 minutes. There are no barriers for this. “How to survive?” is another question. Not everyone succeeds in it, as the market is already very much overloaded with media.

I am looking forward to the emergence of a media outlet that will focus not on news, but on reports, investigations, and high-quality longreads. Besides, it should be commercially successful and popular. So far, there are no courageous entrepreneurs, who are ready to invest in such a difficult and risky project in terms of making a profit. There is not enough of cool video content, YouTube is developing very slowly. In this case, I am also looking forward to the projects similar to the ones created in Russia.

Are there any media conglomerates, which are either controlled by the government or independent private groups of the elite?

The National TV and Radio Company which is broadcasting a big number of popular TV and radio channels is the largest mass media conglomerate in the country. It is controlled by the government. The company UzReport, which owns such TV channels as: UzReport TV, UzReport World, Futbol TV, and the popular website UzReport News and other resources belong to the private conglomerates. Sometimes, individual entrepreneurs and politicians try to create their own conglomerates, but such attempts are not always successful. For example, after functioning for less than a month, Togri.uz, an ambitious and multi-budgeted media outlet associated by some of the observers with Jahongir Artykhodzhayev, Mayor (khokim) of Tashkent, and his business empire called Akfa-Artel, which was closed in September 2019. In 2018, the same thing happened with Turon 24, an equally ambitious project. In general, most popular Uzbek and Russian language media outlets in Uzbekistan belong to different, independent owners. This is a very good situation, because much more space is left for criticism and different points of view. However, it is clear that strategic-minded businessmen and politicians will eventually begin to get separate resources under their control. So far, no such processes have been seen in Uzbekistan.

Just recently, Tajikistan, with its rich aesthetic traditions, has seemingly made a breakthrough in the fashion arena with some great designers like Khurshed Sattorov (born in 1981), Nafisa Imronova (1991) and Umed Kuchkaliev (1979). At the end of 2019, Sattorov was awarded the honorary title of visiting professor at the Beijing City University, which will allow him to promote the history of his country’s cultural heritage in China during the length of his professorship in 2020. Nafisa Imronova has also received recent recognition, as she has been selected to participate in an upcoming fashion show in France. And, for the first time in the history of the Tajik fashion industry, the brand ZHIWJ by Nafisa Imranova has represented Tajikistan at the Paris Oriental Fashion Show in the Louvre. Nafisa’s brand, ZHIWJ, showed her new Navruz collection, which encompassed the rich history and culture of the Tajik people.

Could this be the long-awaited breakthrough sought by Tajik artists that have been trying to send a message to the world about the clothes and style of the small mountainous republic lost in Central Asia?

Author

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Lolisanam Ulugova

Lolisanam has been an art manager in Tajikistan since 2000. She has contributed to writing and producing the nation’s first 3-D animation film, a short designed to promote awareness of environmental issues among children. She holds a Master’s degree from the University of Turin, Italy and an undergraduate degree in Russian Language and Literature. She was a Global Cultural Fellow at the Institute for International Cultural Relations at the University of Edinburgh and participated in the Central Asian-Azerbaijan (CAAFP) fellowship program at the George Washington University at Elliott School of International Affairs for Fall 2019.

A glance to history

In the recent past, the Tajik fashion industry developed similarly to the fashion industries of the other former Soviet republics. There were educational institutions at the middle (uchilische) and higher (institute) level to train fashion designers for light industry factories. Graduates were supposed to be high profile specialists, having knowledge about the material (fabric and accessories), and about the history and ethnography of the region. Svetlana Gnatush (1956), who lived and worked as the chief fashion designer in Tajikistan’s Republican House of Models and left the country during the civil war (1992-1997), believes that the fashion industry in Soviet Tajikistan developed at a rapid pace. She argues that Tajiks had always adored and possessed the desire to dress stylishly. “Fashion is self-expression, a demonstration of your personality, an opportunity to show that you are not like everyone else, and this is very true with regard to Tajiks,” she says.

She recalls that at one of the last events of the USSR in Almaty (Almaty) in 1990, a Fashion Festival, the Tajik team won almost all the prizes, having distinguished themselves in the “Avant-garde in knitwear,” “Men’s Clothing,” and “Modern Clothing” nominations due to Gnatush’s authorship. The Tajik Republican House of Models even had an agreement with India on the mass production of joint apparel, and they had presented a catalog of products with an affiliate of Unitech International, an Indian joint venture named Khovar TT. Unfortunately, all of these arrangements ended up left on paper because of the break-up of the Soviet Union.

Looking at Svetlana Gnatush’s photos of past years, it is immediately noticeable that there is a big difference between what they sewed/how they dressed before and what Tajik fashion designers offer their clients now. One could admit that there was little Tajik flavor in the previous era of clothes—an observation I made to Svetlana: there was nothing original except for ornaments and patterns in previous models of the Soviet period in Tajik clothing. Her response was that this was the state order (zakaz). “We had to dress people in a modern way,” said the artist. The main censorship body at the time was the art council, which made plant or factory level decisions for the fashion industry in each republic. Artistic councils in Moscow established a dressing policy across the entire Soviet country. It was a state policy which advised what people in each republic would/should wear. Along the way, I was able to see how the principle of what and how to dress remained the same in Tajikistan, which inherited a Soviet dressing policy that was soon adapted into a national recommendations agenda. The Ministry of Culture introduced a book of recommendations that told women what they should (and should not) wear. The book is filled with photos of models wearing outfits suitable for “women from seven to seventy.”

In the past, the habitual manner of dressing in Soviet life was largely practical: although it incorporated ornaments and patterns in various regions of the country, it was easy for this to become lost among other models of fashion designers from other Soviet republics. What Tajik fashion designers are doing now is very different from what they did before, but very much like what neighboring countries in the region are also doing.

Ethnic ornaments in the synthesis of a traditional costume with European clothes are the distinguishing traits of fashionable clothes of Tajik couturiers. These features have become an integral part of any designer’s costume and repertoire.

Key players in the field

The fashion industry began its development in an independent Tajikistan after the end of the civil war (1991-1997), when the country was getting back on its feet and rebuilding its infrastructure with external support. This was when Khurshed Sattorov, Farvardin Atashin, and Umed Kuchkaliev began their career in fashion as non-professionals—although Kuchkaliev later received a diploma in clothing design from the local Technological University. Incidentally, he held his first show at a nightclub in 2005, which was called “Oriental Dreams,” believing nightclubs to be a suitable place to find wealthy clients.

As one of the vanguards of Tajikistan’s fashion industry, Mavluda Khamraeva (1973) described them as follows, identifying their specific areas of skill and specialism: Khurshed Sattorov was strong in embroidery (gulduzi), Farvardin Otashin in sewing technology, and Umed Kuchkaliev in cut patterns. Mavluda Hamraeva wanted to help with the modernization of the country’s fashion industry after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Having a background in economics but coming from a creative family, she actively helped rebuild the country. According to Khamraeva, she began with the manufacturing of children’s clothing, of which there was an acute shortage in the destroyed country. Her first showroom opened in Khojent (in the center of the Sogd province) in 1998, and she gained momentum by serving the population with good-quality clothes. She led the list of fashion designers at the 2002 Arjang festival—the first cultural event organized by the Swiss Office for Cooperation in Tajikistan—celebrating peace and affluence in the post-civil war era along with Ravshana Sheralieva (1986) and Mukaramma Kayumova (1953). While Sheralieva was still an inexperienced designer of clothes and tried to present outfits with a European cut, Mukaramma Kayumova, one of the famous masters in the technique of zar-douzi (embroidery in gold) and an already established clothing designer, was focused only on her highly individual production of traditional wear, which mainly dressed participants at weddings and celebrations. Prices for such products could often only be affordable to wealthy clients, or men who had saved for weddings.

Nafisa Imronova joined the fashion industry of the country later. She immediately made a name for herself as an audacious designer of collectible clothes in white and red colors, taking the basis of the traditional costume of the people of Badakhshan, where she herself came from. In her first collection “Kuhihoi Pomir” (the Pamir mountains), white and red colors were dominant (the main colors of the Badakhshan folk costume, where white represents the purity of the human soul, and red is the color of the amulet that does not allow the unkind spirits to harm the owner of the clothes). She, like her fellow designers, began to synthesize a European cut with a traditional Tajik dress, modifying it, turning it into an authorial ensemble. Participation in many international level trainings in the USA, Singapore, and Italy allowed her to learn the basics of a modern approach to the functioning of her brand.

The fact that it was her brand, ZHIWJ, that was chosen to participate in the Paris Oriental Fashion Show in the Louvre indicates both the modern approach to her organization of her business and her love for passionate connoisseurs of the traditions of her people.

Supplementation

Exploring the topic of fashion and its development in Tajikistan, I met with various key people in this area. Here, there are few specialists in the field of fashion as a sphere of reflection of society, its norms, style, etiquette, and organization of space. Among them is a specialist with a degree in the history of Tajik costume, Gulrukhsor Umarova, (1978) who holds a PhD from the Stroganov Academy in Russia. She also believes that the role of clothing among Tajiks is important in the context of belonging to an ethnic group, region, and aesthetic setting. She says that national traditions were preserved only in Tajik women’s clothing and have a certain semantic load. Each region had its own cut of clothes, patterns, and ornaments, also a way to tie scarves. In general, the Tajik people are distinguished by the brightness of colors in their clothes, only blue was the color of mourning, and black was generally considered not to be a “lucky” color. And today, this color remains “excluded” from the color palette in clothes, alluding to its alienness, the hostility introduced from outside, and its association with radical Islam.

Umarova asserts that the stars of the Tajik scene—as well as the heroines of Turkish TV soap operas and the merchants of imported fabrics—all contribute to the creation of fashionable trends in Tajikistan. She says that in spite of the boom of fashion design and the country’s awareness of style, it is at risk of being unable to develop, because everyone has the same cut, the same robe, and the same length of cardigans and jackets. When it comes to global trends of fashion, we are not subject to these trends. In fashion, the silhouette, length, color, cut, decor, and fabric should change and should be varied, but in the Tajik fashion context, these elements are stagnant. Stage costumes dominate the industry because all young designers prefer to sew for singers and young girls, fashion lovers, who can afford to pay. According to Umarova, fashion is a phenomenon invented by men and aimed at the imitation and worship of idols—envy often drives local fashionistas, and the suggestions of family and society (religious and family values) contribute to the development of fashion in Tajikistan.

Speaking of the role and significance of embroideries and patterns, I also met Dilshod Rahimi (1974), deputy director of the Research Institute of Culture and Information of Tajikistan. He spoke in detail about the “chakan” art of embroidery. There is a whole gallery of clothes with embroidered chakans, from a headdress (tokki-chakan), to outerwear garments (dress-chakan), to the bedspread (suzani). The “chakan” art of embroidery is included in the UNESCO Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, about which Dilshod Rahimi proudly told me.

Investigating the subject of fabrics for fashionable clothes, I met with Nasibakhon Aminova (1978), the executive director of the National Association of Small and Medium Enterprises of the Republic of Tajikistan (NAMSB). She told me that designers mainly purchase fabrics offered by merchants brought in from China, and sometimes from Turkey and Kyrgyzstan. She looks at fashion designers as part of the craft production process, but with a large share of creative enthusiasm in their works.

According to Aminova, despite the fact that some fashion designers, such as Khurshed Sattorov, have their own laboratory for the production of own collections and have attracted specialists in this field from the Technological University, this is not enough to enable real discussion about the great achievements in the country’s fashion industry. The fashion industry is still far from getting to mass production. For the fashion industry to really work well, it needs to combine the efforts of artisans with fashion designers: those who can sew or cut must unite with those who can sell and promote products. Positive developments have occurred: the protection of the rights and interests of artisans is improving; NAMSB has recently implemented a project aimed at promoting the development of the private sector in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; and there is an increase of demand and competitiveness in the domestic and international markets. In Tajikistan, there are small factories for the production of national fabrics such as adras (ikat) and atlas (silk), but the quality of these fabrics is inferior to similar products in Margilan (Uzbekistan).

Conclusion

There are three educational art institutions in Tajikistan that train specialists in the field of modeling and fashion design. New applicants to these institutions dream of fame and financial success, looking at the big names of the fashion industry that are already in high demand in the local market. If you want to buy clothes from Imronova, Sattorov, or Kuchkaliev, it will cost you hundreds–usually starting at a price of at least $100 for the more affordable options. Not cheap at all. But even the successful lines from these designers fall short of the scale necessary to become a full-cycle industry within the developed local and neighboring market, with its own production of fabric and accessories, a strong sense of identity, and a modern aesthetic (not to mention the ability to respond to the huge impact of environmentalism and the need for sustainability in today’s fashion industry). The current modeling and fashion design students of Tajikistan’s art institutions will need to understand and navigate all of these challenges in order to fully realize the potential of Tajikistan’s fashion industry going forward.

In the former Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan, thousands of young girls and women are kidnapped every year to be forced into marriage. Although the practice was outlawed in 2013, bride kidnapping continues to exist, with destructive consequences for society.

Profile

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Iris Oppelaar

Iris Oppelaar is a multimedia journalist who covers stories focused on human rights and migration in Central Asia and Russia. Iris holds an MA in Politics, Security and Integration from the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (UCL, United Kingdom) and a BA in European Studies. Her recent multimedia work WILDNESS has been selected for the Jakarta International Photo Festival 2019.

Profile

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About WILDNESS

With WILDNESS, Iris aims to de-sensationalize the practice of bride kidnapping and instead reveal the motives and societal expectations that underlie it, providing insight into the lives of ordinary Kyrgyz in the process. The work shows an ongoing struggle within Kyrgyz society and how changing norms may provide hope for the future. WILDNESS has been selected for the Jakarta International Photo Festival 2019.

It is often referred to as a tradition, perceived as the obvious thing to do when one is ready for marriage.

If a man has his eye on a girl, he may inform his family members about the upcoming kidnapping, gather his friends together, and wait for the right time. The girl is dragged into a car and brought to his home. Once a girl is brought to the house of the groom, his female family members will persuade the girl to stay, often using physical and mental violence. This part of the process can last for days, until the girl eventually agrees to marriage.

Once a girl’s parents become aware that their daughter has been kidnapped, there is often no way back. The family’s honor was violated the moment the girl was dragged onto the property of the kidnapper. Social pressure often keeps the parents from taking their daughter home with them.

The UN estimates that 12,000 cases of kidnapping occur every year. Although the punishment on bride kidnapping was tightened in 2013 (the practice has been illegal since Kyrgyzstan’s independence from the USSR), prosecution is rare. A wide range of factors may explain the low prosecution rate, ranging from social pressure not to press charges to a lack of confidence in the authorities. In some cases, the kidnapper is a blood relative or a member of the “extended family,” further complicating the situation.

Despite legislative measures, widespread cultural acceptance of the practice persists. While interviewing dozens of people in rural parts of Northern Kyrgyzstan, I learned about the scale of the problem and the devastating impact it has on society. Physical and mental violence is common during kidnappings and these experiences haunt the victims for years. A number of suicides have even been reported after kidnappings.

First of all, I was struck by the ease with which people—men and women, young girls and boys—spoke about this practice. Everyone I spoke to had witnessed a kidnapping, assisted in a kidnapping, or had family or friends who were kidnapped. Those who had played a role in a kidnapping were often proud instead of expressing shame or regret about their actions. There is absolutely no taboo on the topic of bride kidnapping.

Second, and just as remarkable, is the role of women. Women sometimes entrap their friends in order to get them kidnapped; female family members play an important role in convincing a kidnapped girl to stay and agree to marriage. Those mothers and grandmothers who were themselves kidnapped many years ago now play an important role in convincing kidnapped girls to stay and marry their child or grandchild—thus keeping the practice alive.

Hope for the Future?

While following three women—Makhabat, Ijamal, and Madina—for over two years, I came to a third realization, namely that there might be hope for the future. Makhabat was kidnapped by an acquaintance, refused to marry him, and returned home with her father. Ijamal went to study in the capital, Bishkek, out of fear of being kidnapped. Both are now married for love. As Ijamal’s mother, Madina, told me the last time we met, “It is all about how we educate and raise our children.”

Education is one of the ways to stop this cruel practice. Young boys, who joke that they will kidnap a girl themselves one day, are the ones who should be educated. They should hear the stories of young girls who have experienced kidnapping, see their tears, and feel how deeply they have been wounded by what people in Kyrgyzstan call a “tradition”—even though it is not. It is just a practice of violating the rights of women that began from one day to the next and can hopefully be stopped in the same way soon.

Half of Kazakhstan’s population was born after Nazarbayev took power three decades ago: those aged under 29 comprise 9 million Kazakhstani citizens, or 51 percent of the population.

They have no direct memory of the Soviet regime, only family recollections, though many of them do recall their parents’ struggles in the difficult first decade of the country’s independence. Since the early 2000s, they have lived in a world of political stability and relative material affluence, developing a strong consumerist culture. Even with growing government restrictions on media, religion, and formal public expression, they have been raised in a comparatively free country.

Author

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Marlene Laruelle

Associate Director and Research Professor at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES), Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University.

Marlene Laruelle works on Russia and Central Asia and explores post-Soviet political, social and cultural changes through the prism of nationhood and nationalism. 

 http://www.marlene-laruelle.com

Who are they? What do they think and wish? What are their social and cultural practices and behaviors? How do they see the world and Kazakhstan’s place in it?

The collective volume “Nazarbayev Generation. Studies on Youth in Kazakhstan” (Lexington, September 2019) edited by Marlene Laruelle answers some of these questions.

The most rapidly changing and receptive segment of Kazakhstani society, youth has been one of the main objects of a new wave of research that is transforming our knowledge of the country and helping us move beyond the usual clichés about “Nazarbayev-stan.” It is not that the natural change of generations was ignored by scholars and the policy community: the expectation of a presidential transition has always been accompanied by discourses about the long-awaited arrival in power of new generations. But the view of these generations was oversimplified, focusing on their political orientations almost to the exclusion of their social and cultural practices. A black-and-white narrative contrasted the Bolashak generation—those trained abroad under the Kazakhstani state program, who supposedly represented liberal, Western-oriented youth—with desperate provincial youth motivated by jihadism and going to volunteer in the Syrian war theater.

What can we say about the Nazarbayev Generation?

The Nazarbayev Generation is quite conformist in its life goals: it believes in family values, marriage, having children, healthy living, and material comfort. Scholars Azamat and Barbara Junisbai and Daniyar Kosnazarov have done the surveys confirming this.

Young Kazakhstanis are not attracted to a quest for knowledge and see higher education only as a tool for getting a good job; they trust that having the right social connections will help them build their lives and careers.[1] The report by Friedrich Ebert Foundation Kazakhstan found that Kazakh youth is far from a revolutionary generation: they do not challenge their parents’ values and ways of life, trust family more than any other institution, and overwhelmingly (more than 90 percent) view their relationships with their parents positively.[2]

They still differ from older cohorts in some respects: they are more individualistic and believe in their uniqueness; they are better disposed toward elements of a market economy, such as a private sector, entrepreneurship, and a banking system; they display greater respect for individual success; and they are less troubled by social inequality and less supportive of the state addressing this inequality.[3] They are thus the children of the economic liberalism that has shaped independent Kazakhstan. Consequently, the feeling of being affected by a class divide is mentioned by only one-third of ethnic Kazakhs—with Atyrau region showing the highest levels; it is also a very serious concern for some ethnic minorities, such as Ukrainians and Chechens, but not for Russians.[4]

Kazakhstani youths’ support for economic liberalism does not translate into them being specifically favorable toward a democratic regime or liberal values. The 2011 World Values Survey found that all generations broadly supported the vague principles of a “democratic system” (while also desiring a “strong leader”), but that 18-to-29-year-olds were, if anything, somewhat less supportive (84 percent compared to 90 percent among over-50s, for example).[5]

Similarly, research conducted by Barbara Junisbai, Azamat Junisbai, and Christopher Whitsel demonstrates that 18-to-29-year-old Kazakhstanis are significantly less likely to express support for democracy than previous generations—or even their generational counterparts in Kyrgyzstan. Less than a quarter of them believe that “citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of leaders,” compared to 87 percent for the population as a whole.[6] While two-thirds of youth declare that they are occasionally interested in politics, less than 10 percent of them discuss politics with family and friends or participate in any form of civic activism.[7]

As Junisbai, Junisbai, and Whitsel conclude, “In Kazakhstan, young people appear to be socialized in accordance with both aspects of the political context under consideration […]: presidential authoritarianism, which in Kazakhstan has a distinctly paternalistic flavor, and patronage politics.”[8]

The 2015 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung surveys confirms how low altruism and participation in citizens’ initiatives fall on youths’ lists of priorities. They are quite happy with society as it is: women, ethnic minorities and religious people are considered to have sufficient rights.[9]

Just as they are not actively pro-democracy, youth are not especially attracted to so-called “Western values.” A 2014 survey of young Kazakhstanis commissioned by the Council for Youth Policy Under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan found that only 5 percent considered the US a good model for development and just 13 percent considered Europe to be, while 22 percent preferred the Russian model and 43 percent favored a unique path for Kazakhstan.[10]

A similar survey conducted in 2015 by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung found that 47 percent of youth identified Russia as the country to which Kazakhstan “should look for its development,” while only 19 percent felt that Europe should be the foremost model, 10 percent China, and 8 percent the US.[11]

However, there are several definition of liberal values. A more refined perception of it helps dissociate the rejection of liberalism in the sense of ultraliberalism or identity politics—laissez-faire capitalism and promotion of individual sexual and ethnic differences—from the backing of a more traditional liberalism—a responsible social democracy that provides good public services and protects basic individual rights.[12]

The Nazarbayev generation displays genuine cultural pluralism. How can this translate into pluralism at the political and institutional level?

The Kazakhstani state administration is quite young on average, with more than 22,000 civil servants under the age of 30 in 2014, but youth work on the administrative side, not the decision-making one.[13] That being said, the long-awaited rejuvenation of elites seems to have begun in the past few years. Several new figures born in the 1970s have taken up ministerial and mayoral posts:[14] Bauyrzhan Baibek (1974) is now mayor of Almaty, the first Bolashak to reach such a high level; Baglan Mailybayev (1975) spent 6 years (2011–2017) as Vice-President of the Presidential Administration; Maulen Ashimbayev (1971), trained at Tufts University’s Fletcher School, is first deputy of the presidential party Nur Otan; and former mayor of Astana Aset Issekeshev (1971) is head of the Presidential Administration. Minister of Information and Communication Dauren Abayev (1979) has become one of the government figures most active on social media. The state-controlled media sector has been reinvigorated with the arrival of a team of young, nationalist-minded figures, such as Erlan Karin (1976), who have dynamized media production, especially in Kazakh, and have reached out to the younger generation. A rapper, ZAQ, even won a seat in Zhas Otan, the youth wing of Nur Otan. To complement that trend, former Press Secretary of Nur Otan Aleksandr Aksyutits has been appointed head of a new social media holding, Salem Social Media.

Over the course of Nazarbayev’s three-decade reign, Kazakhstan has evolved from a “post-Soviet” republic facing the dilemma of a late and sudden independence to a new paradigm where the legacy of the Soviet Union has gradually receded and made room for new realities. First, Kazakhstan is succeeding in its “Kazakhification”: it is the country of Kazakhs, in which ethnic minorities represent a declining part of the population. The old divide between the Russified urban world and the Kazakh-speaking rural world has been transformed: rural dwellers have been moving to cities and confront old urbanites with different cultural habits; cities are progressively becoming a Kazakh-dominated realm, both ethnically and linguistically. The issue of the “Russianness” of Kazakhstani northern regions is likewise gradually losing its political acuity, being replaced by points of contention within the Kazakh nation itself. The 2016 land protests revealed that only the Kazakh-speaking segment of the population saw the authorities as betraying the nation’s interests, while the Russian-speaking part of the population did not mobilize, silently supporting the government.

At stake for the Nazarbayev Generation will be not so much defining Kazakhness in opposition to the Soviet legacy or the Russianness expressed by Russian minorities as defining Kazakhness among Kazakhs.

What will be the role of Oralmans as a “yardstick” of a less Sovietized/Russified/cosmopolitan Kazakhness? How can a balance be found between Western and Southern Kazakhstan, on the one hand, and the rest of the country, on the other, given what seems to be a growing gap in values? What kind of legitimacy will Islam have in the public space? To what extent will mores and values be based on “reinvented traditions” and the search for cultural authenticity, especially in gender relations, or on more cosmopolitan worldviews and behaviors? Should Kazakhstan project itself as leading the Central Asian region or move toward the lonelier trajectory of Kazakh Eli—the “land of Kazakhs,” a name sometimes referred to by those who want to dissociate Kazakhstan from the other “stans”—looking to Mongolia, South Korea, or Singapore as its model? What political regime and political culture will this Nazarbayev Generation promote: a patronal regime with an improved, more efficient, technocratic culture or a more genuine plurality and institutional consolidation?

The transition that just has been made in Kazakhstan is a first step toward answering some of these pressing questions

[1] See Junisbai & Junisbai and Kosnazarov in the upcoming volume “Nazarbayev Generation. Studies on Youth in Kazakhstan” (Lexington, September 2019).

[2] Umbetaliyeva, Rakisheva, and Teschendorf, “Youth in Central Asia: Kazakhstan,” 20.

[3] See Azamat K. Junisbai, “Understanding Economic Justice Attitudes in Two Countries: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,” Social Forces 88, no. 4 (June 2010): 1677-1702.

[4] Umbetaliyeva, Rakisheva, and Teschendorf, “Youth in Central Asia: Kazakhstan,” 105-106.

[5] World Values Survey, “WVS-7 in Kazakhstan.”

[6] See Junisbai & Junisbai in the upcoming volume “Nazarbayev Generation. Studies on Youth in Kazakhstan” (Lexington, September 2019).

[7] Serik Beisembayev, “Politicheskie i ideologicheskie ustanovki kazakhstanskoi molodezhi,” “Strategiia” Center for Social and Political Studies, 2013, www.ofstrategy.kz. Shugyla Kilybayeva, Gulnar Nassimova, and Aliya Massalimova, “The Kazakhstani Youth’s Engagement in Politics,” Studies of Transition States and Societies 9, no. 1 (2017), http://publications.tlu.ee/index.php/stss/article/view/533.

[8] Barbara Junisbai, Azamat Junisbai, and Christopher Whitsel, “What Makes ‘Ardent Democrats’ in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan?” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 489 (October 2017), http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/what-makes-ardent-democrats-kazakhstan-and-kyrgyzstan.

[9] Umbetaliyeva, Rakisheva, and Teschendorf, “Youth in Central Asia: Kazakhstan,” 22.

[10] Serik Beysembayev, “Tendentsii sotsial’no-demograficheskogo razvitiia kazakhstanskogo obshchestva (na baze sotsiologicheskikh issledovanii),” Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz 14, no. 2 (2011): 83–100; Molodezh Kazakhstana 2014 (Astana: Council for Youth Policy under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2014).

[11] Umbetaliyeva, Rakisheva, and Teschendorf, “Youth in Central Asia: Kazakhstan,” 155-170.

[12] See Galym Zhussipbek & Zhanar Nagayeva in the upcoming volume “Nazarbayev Generation. Studies on Youth in Kazakhstan” (Lexington, September 2019).

[13] Z. Bukanova and B. Masatova, “Obshch’estvenno-politicheskoe uchastie kazakhstanskoi molodezhi v kontekste modernizatsii gosudarstvennoi molodezhnoi politiki,” Research Center of Youth, 2014, http://youthpolicycenter.kz/ru/.fundamentalnye-issledovaniya/obschestvenno-politicheskoe-uchastie-kazahstanskoymolodezhi-v-kontekste-modernizacii-gosudarstvennoy-mol.html, p. 155.

[14] Gul’nara Bazhkenova, “Kazahstanskie ‘Semidesiatniki’ v Politike,” Radio Azattyq, August 13, 2015, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/semidesyatniki-blog-bazhkenovoy/27186368.html.

Illustration by
Nicolas Journoud

Author

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Aigoul Abdoubaetova researches the growing gap in educational opportunities in Kyrgyzstan. She is Programme Manager of the MA in Politics and Security at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and has over nine years of professional experience working in higher education administration. Previously, Aigoul worked for a number of non-profit organizations specializing in the areas of youth, international adoption, and other social issues. She holds an MA in International Studies from the University of Oregon and a BA in Foreign Languages from Osh State University.e after 1991.

Overview of Secondary Education Opportunities in Bishkek

As of 2018, Kyrgyzstan’s GDP per capita was reported to be $1,221.[1] Yet annual tuition at the most expensive top four private schools in the country ranges between $11,000[2] and $23,800.[3] These numbers are indicative of growing inequality in accessing and obtaining secondary education in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan.

Over the past two decades, secondary educational opportunities in Bishkek have become more diversified, due both to the growing number and variety of private schools and the division of public schools into different categories depending on the quality of education they offer.

As of 2017, there were 114 private schools in Kyrgyzstan, and there may now be as many as 187.[4] Private schools are very heterogeneous, with a diverse mix of prices and services.[5] Many of them have excellent infrastructure and facilities, small class sizes, and better-paid teachers.

Source: “Gid Kaktus. Chastnye shkoly Bishkeka. Usloviia i tseny,” Kaktus Media, May 25, 2018

The boom in private education is occurring in the context of acute shortages and the deteriorating quality of public schools. Public schools face myriad issues,[6] including extreme overcrowding due to internal migration that has caused the population of Bishkek to expand.

Yet the outlook for public schools is not altogether bleak. There are a few high-performing “elite” public schools (gymnasiums and lyceums) that achieve top results on the NST,[7] a national merit-based selection system that tests the knowledge and skills of secondary school graduates applying for government scholarships to local universities.[8] High-performing elite public schools are seen as prestigious and are difficult to get into.

Through my own research and drawing on publicly available information, I identify six types of secondary education opportunities in Bishkek: three types of private schools based on their tuition costs and two types of public schools based on their performance. A sixth option, private tutors and learning centers, is also widely used to obtain additional secondary education.

My paper sought to answer the following specific questions:

1) How do parents in Bishkek make school choices and navigate the fragmented landscape of the secondary education system?

2) To what degree do parents’ educational choices reflect and reinforce growing socio-economic inequality in a society that is undergoing significant transformations

My research employed quantitative and qualitative methods. The main group of informants were parents of schoolchildren aged 7-17 who attend public and private schools in Bishkek. 115 parents were surveyed for a questionnaire and a further 22 in-depth interviews with parents and 13 interviews with experts were conducted. This summary of findings is structured around two main themes: parents’ motivations for choosing private or public schools for their children and discussion of inequality in children’s access to education.

Read full paper

Parents’ Motivations for Choosing Private Schools

The survey results showed that parents chose private schools to access a wide range of privileges:

Parents selected private schools because of their small class sizes, more individualized teacher-student interaction, and less conservative teaching methods.

Most private schools in Bishkek provide all-day child care services: they organize meals, after-school activities, and homework help on the school premises. Parents are interested in such conveniences.

Expensive international private schools appeal to parents because of their focus on English. Having native English speakers as teachers, an international curriculum taught only in English, and in-house college counselors helps students get into universities abroad.

Turkish private schools in Bishkek that belong to the Sapat International Education Institution attract parents by providing a good quality of education as well as instilling moral values such as respect for parents and the elderly, tolerance, compassion, altruism, brotherhood/sisterhood, etc.

Parents’ Motivations for Choosing Public Schools

The survey results revealed a completely different picture of parental motivations for choosing public schools. Location-related reasons were the most important factor for the majority of parents:

Parents chose public schools because of these schools’ proximity. Parents who sent their children to public schools were divided between those who used neighborhood schools (assigned by territory) and those who bypassed this system in search of better-quality schools while still focusing on those schools that were not too far from their homes.

Parents only chose public schools for their education quality in the case of high-performing schools. They found qualified teachers, specialized curriculum, discipline, and high NST scores to be important factors in choosing these schools. Those who sent their children to low-performing neighborhood schools, meanwhile, were not satisfied with the quality of teaching.

Attending public schools generally takes only half a day, leaving ample flexible afterschool time to be used for extra-curricular activities, music schools, or attending private tutoring.

Some parents find that public schools better prepare children for real life. Public schools allow children to socialize with other children from diverse backgrounds, become more independent, and gain stronger life skills.

Portrait of Educational Inequality in Bishkek

Parents with higher incomes can afford private schools, while public school users are those who have average incomes or are poor.

Children in private schools are not limited by distance: their parents can take them across the city in their own cars or pay fees for transportation organized by schools. Mobility is connected to income.

Parents of private school children access privileges that are not available in public schools: small classes with proper conditions, a good diet, and better treatment of children by teachers and staff.

The quality of education in private schools was rated higher (68 percent) than in public schools (33 percent). Parents from private schools were more satisfied—4.29 out of 5, compared to 3.74 out of 5 for parents of children in public schools.

There is a noticeable gap between the two types of schools in terms of the future plans that parents envisioned for their children. Eighty-one percent of parents of private school children indicated that their child would study abroad, compared to 20 percent of parents of public school children.

There is also a very strong positive correlation between future university plans abroad and income. Those who have high incomes have more opportunities both for private education and for education abroad, while those who lack money have fewer.

While there is a straightforward correlation between income and school choice, the paper suggests looking at educational inequality through other lenses in addition to the economic one. In order to understand education inequality, it is necessary to consider different forms of capital that families utilize: financial, but also social and cultural.

Parents with wider social capital could access more educational opportunities. Social networks helped parents to figure out which were the good schools and find qualified teachers and tutors.

Cultural capital—the knowledge of how institutions work—helped parents to make strategic decisions, such as preparing children ahead of time for admission to a competitive school; taking advantage of various extracurricular activities; seeking out additional learning opportunities through private tutors; and being actively engaged in their children’s education, constantly motivating and directing them. Parents’ education (human capital) also helped. It is those families that do not possess any of these capitals that are the most disadvantaged.

The structuring of families into a pyramid according to their possession of these three forms of capital helps us better visualize and understand how education inequality in contemporary Bishkek is being shaped.

While wealthy families in the “elite” and “new Kyrgyz” categories chose private schools, many middle-income urban families primarily accessed high-performing and competitive public schools. Poor urban families and internal migrants lacked both financial and non-financial resources: disadvantaged in accessing not only private schools, but also high-quality public schools, they mostly attended low-performing neighborhood schools.

Unfortunately, poor families in the bottom two categories make up the majority of the urban population of Bishkek. Policymakers should prioritize the needs of low-performing schools and increase poor families’ access to quality education.

[1]“The Poorest Countries in the World,” Focus Economics (blog), last accessed September 2, 2018, https://www.focus-economics.com/blog/the-poorest-countries-in-the-world.

[2] “Gid Kaktus. Chastnye shkoly Bishkeka. Usloviia i tseny,” Kaktus Media, May 25, 2018, last accessed October 11, 2018, https://kaktus.media/doc/338956_gid_kaktus._chastnye_shkoly_bishkeka._ysloviia_i_ceny.html.

[3] Z. Kozhobaeva, “Stoit li ucheba v chastnykh shkolakh zaplachennykh deneg?” Azzatyk, February 6, 2017, last accessed October 11, 2018, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/28281350.html.

[4] Kozhobaeva, “Stoit li ucheba.”

[5] Kaktus Media, “Gid Kaktus.”

[6] Sanzhar Eraliev, “Skol’noe obrazovanie. Problemy dostigli krainei tochki,” Azzatyk, September 6, 2018, last accessed November 21, 2018, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyz_education_school-problems/29474742.html.

[7] “Reiting. Top 20 shkol Bishkeka 2018 goda,” Bilim Akipress, August 24, 2018, last accessed November 21, 2018, http://bilim.akipress.org/ru/news:1466310.

[8] Duishon Shamatov, “The Impact of Standardized Testing on University Entrance Issues in Kyrgyzstan,” European Education 44, no. 1 (2012): 71-92.

The authors of this research explored vulnerability and resilience factors through a nation-wide study that covered more than 1050 respondents (younger than 29) in all seven oblasts (regions) of Kyrgyzstan using the extensive toolkit of research methods and a wide range of quantitative and qualitative tools. Analysis was conducted in five domains of young people’s lives connected to radicalization: 1) grievances, 2) politics, 3) religion, 4) socialization, and 5) psychology.

Our research shows that grievances are the most important factor of vulnerability

Young people who experienced discrimination have the highest vulnerability scores. These scores are particularly high for young people who experienced discrimination perpetrated by state officials and police. Such young people are much more likely to have strong desires to avenge others and justify violence for various purposes, including religious ones.

Young people in Kyrgyzstan grow up seeing a lot of social and state injustice and very high levels of corruption around them. They name corruption and low morals as the biggest problems facing Kyrgyz society. To the question “Do you see our state as just?” 56% answered in the negative. Respondents provided various explanations for this, which we coded and summarized in Table 1.

Young people see state institutions and actors as predatory agents who use their privileged positions to make money from the rest of society. The theme of corruption and state predation forms the core of many young people’s radical ideas. Members of radical organizations can exploit such perceptions to recruit young people by promising them the just Islamic alternative.

Young people report higher degree of injustice and discrimination against practicing Muslims, particularly from police. For young women, this is often related to their Islamic attire. Nonetheless, young people believe that religious freedom and the conditions of the Muslim population in Kyrgyzstan are better than they are in the neighboring Central Asian countries, Russia, Western countries, and China.

Politics

Young people’s interest in politics is very low. This is mostly because they have very limited opportunities to participate in formal politics. Instead, young people are active in more informal groups and movements.

Young people’s political views are becoming more and more connected to their religious views. Nearly one-third of survey respondents would support a more religious candidate and even the introduction of sharia law to replace the constitution. Young people also have a very high degree of trust in religious organizations, higher than in the state and international organizations.

When young people evaluate the influence of major geopolitical actors on the situation in Kyrgyzstan and the Middle East, we observe a clear bifurcation: they have a positive view of Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and a negative view of USA, EU and Iran. Very few young people believe in the conspiracy that the West seeks to dominate Muslim lands.

Religion

An increasing number of young people practice religion. Most young people do not align themselves with any specific religious groups, but of those who do, the largest group sympathizes with Tablighi Jamaat. Three Turkish groups (Khizmet, Nurjular, and Sulaimanchiler) and Salafis are less popular. Young people who sympathize with Salafis and Sulaimanchiler are the most vulnerable to radicalization, while those who sympathize with Khizmet and Nurjular are the most resilient. Tablighi Jamaat sympathizers are in the middle.

Books, family members, religious scholars, and local imams are the most popular sources of information about religion. They are also the safest—they make young people more resilient to radicalization. Young people want to learn more about religion and the most preferable way is through live communication with religious specialists and scholars who can engage them in an open discussion. By contrast, more depersonalized sources, such as the Internet, make people more vulnerable. Easily accessible from anywhere in Kyrgyzstan via mobile devices, it was the main channel through which some of our more radically minded interlocutors obtained information that interested them. 

The poor quality of both religious and secular education is a negative factor. Better educational opportunities, which contribute to stronger critical and analytical thinking abilities and to greater religious and ethnic tolerance, would strengthen young people’s resilience to radical ideas.

Socialization

Parents and family members are the main sources of authority for young people. Young people who are more likely to feel lonely/isolated, have fewer friends, and have more conflicts are more vulnerable to radicalization.

In the past, the Soviet administration paid special attention to building physical and social infrastructure to enable young people to use their free time in a meaningful and productive manner. Sport clubs, interest-based clubs, “houses of culture”, etc., were an important part of almost any settlement in the country. Schools engaged actively with students, offering them opportunities for learning and socializing outside class. Today, with the exception of some large cities, most of that infrastructure has collapsed or deteriorated and children are left to themselves and to the streets.

Young people connected to criminal networks score higher on vulnerability. Belonging to a criminal group or engaging in petty criminal activity is seen as one of the easiest paths to radicalization and extremism, because it already implies violence. This is particularly common in Talas oblast, where criminal groups have more influence. Children can become radicalized not only as members, but also as victims of certain criminal activities. For example, many young people in urban locations are regularly exposed to extortion and racketeering by elder children, many of whom are connected to criminal groups. Young people who are regularly abused and beaten as a part of this money collection practice can be very vulnerable to engagement with criminal radical groups in search of social justice.

Sadly, nearly one-third of young people believe that they should not make friends with representatives of other religions. The attitude to other faiths is quite positive, but the attitude toward people who convert from Islam to Christianity is negative.

Psychology

The average level of life satisfaction is 68% and the average level of aggression is 22%. These figures are not seen as problematic. Young people who score low on life satisfaction and high on aggression are more vulnerable to radicalization. Many experts and stakeholders mentioned psychological complications and an unhealthy family atmosphere as causes of vulnerability. The families where informants with radical experience grew up can also be seen as somewhat dysfunctional.

Socio-economic conditions

Income did not have any significant correlation with vulnerability in the survey. This might be because income is a sensitive question and not all participants answered honestly. More insights came from interviews and focus groups. Poverty and harsh economic conditions, where children grow up seeing the misery of such basic limitations as shortages of drinking water and of calories and vitamins for healthy physical development, make people more vulnerable. Over the quarter-century since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the government has failed to provide employment opportunities, particularly in the more remote regions of Kyrgyzstan. Lack of employment also implies unhappiness and plenty of idle time; members of radical groups can successfully exploit both to recruit young people.

Demographics

Location proves to be a very important factor. Generally speaking, young people in the Southern oblasts of the country are more vulnerable than young people in the North. The two most vulnerable locations are Batken oblast and Osh city. Both have very complex/problematic interethnic relations and a history of conflicts. Naryn and Issyk-Kul oblasts are two most resilient locations.

Occupation is important only for one category—college students score high on vulnerability.

Labor migration can contribute to radicalization in both direct and indirect ways: some young people can become more radical during their own labor migration experience in Russia, while other children are affected by the absence of their parents who are labor migrants in Russia, with the lack of control, moral support, and guidance that this implies.

Contrary to the claims of Kyrgyzstan’s state security services, ethnic minorities are not more vulnerable than ethnic Kyrgyz, quite the contrary.

Conclusion

Looking at these factors of vulnerability and resilience to radicalization in various domains, we come to two final conclusions. First, we see that each domain produces its own unique connection to radicalization, and while some domains might be more important than others, none of these domains can be ignored. Second, while we look at all domains individually, we also see how several domains are interconnected. Thus, we cannot single out one or another domain; instead, we should see radicalization as a very complex phenomenon that is connected to many aspects of young people’s lives.

Bibliography

1. Bhui, K, S. Dinos and Jones. (2012) Psychological Process and Pathways to Radicalization, Journal of Bioterrorism & Biodefense, DOI: 10.4172/2157-2526.S5-003.

2. DeJean (2016) Students Faced with Religious Radicalization Leading to Violence. The More You Know, the More You Can Prevent. Institut de researches ur l’integration professionnelle des immigrants, College de Maisonneuve.

3. Patel, F. (2011) Rethinking Radicalization, Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law.

4. Protsyk, O. & C. Odorfer (2016) Youth and Violent Extremism, in Background Papers on Violent Extremism and its Prevention, Framing Development Solutions to Preventing Violent Extremism.

All data provided by authors

Main picture: UNICEF, Kyrgyzstan